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Abstract
Deep learning-based systems have been shown to be vul-
nerable to adversarial attacks in both digital and physi-
cal domains. While feasible, digital attacks have limited
applicability in attacking deployed systems, including face
recognition systems, where an adversary typically has ac-
cess to the input and not the transmission channel. In such
setting, physical attacks that directly provide a malicious
input through the input channel pose a bigger threat. We
investigate the feasibility of conducting real-time physical
attacks on face recognition systems using adversarial light
projections. A setup comprising a commercially available
web camera and a projector is used to conduct the attack.
The adversary uses a transformation-invariant adversarial
pattern generation method to generate a digital adversarial
pattern using one or more images of the target available to
the adversary. The digital adversarial pattern is then pro-
jected onto the adversary’s face in the physical domain to
either impersonate a target (impersonation) or evade recog-
nition (obfuscation). We conduct preliminary experiments
using two open-source and one commercial face recognition
system on a pool of 50 subjects. Our experimental results
demonstrate the vulnerability of face recognition systems to
light projection attacks in both white-box and black-box at-
tack settings.
1. Introduction
Deep learning-based systems are typically designed un-
der the assumption that the inputs/examples presented to the
system during the test/operational phase follow the same
underlying distribution as the examples used to train the
system. However, recent research has shown security vul-
nerabilities of such systems when this fundamental assump-
tion is violated. More specifically, researchers have shown
that it is possible to craft adversarial examples that vio-
late the aforementioned assumption to fool deep neural net-
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Example of impersonation attack on FaceNet [18]
in white-box setting. Adversarial light projected on adver-
sary’s face in (a) results in the adversary being recognized
as target (b).
works [22] [8].
Most adversarial examples on convolutional neural net-
work architectures (typically used in image classification
scenarios including face recognition) are generated by per-
turbing the pixel intensities directly in the digital domain
[13, 16, 3]. These digital attacks, however, do not directly
translate into the physical domain where an adversary has
access to the open-camera channel. In such setting, the ad-
versary usually does not have access to the image captured
using the camera that is input to the convolutional neural
network. Specifically, consider a face recognition system,
that is deployed, such that it captures a face image of a sub-
ject and compares it to the enrolled faces to validate or es-
tablish the identity of the subject. While security mecha-
nisms can be enforced to safeguard the digital storage and
transmission of facial data captured using the camera, an
adversary can potentially trick the system by providing a
malicious input to the camera directly [10] [7].
A subclass of physical attacks called presentation or
spoofing attacks on face recognition systems achieve this
by creating physical spoofs using one or more face images
of the target (e.g., 2D-printed face photos, 3D masks) [14].
The same objective can also be achieved by crafting phys-
ical adversarial artifacts such as glasses that an adversary
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Figure 2: Setup used for conducting real-time adversarial
light projection attacks on face recognition systems. First,
the adversary captures his/her facial image using a camera,
and uses one or more images of the target to (i) calibrate
the camera-projector setup based on the attack environment,
and (ii) generate a digital adversarial pattern. Next, the ad-
versary projects the digital pattern onto the adversary’s face
in the physical domain using a projector to either imperson-
ate a target or evade recognition.
can wear to either evade recognition or mimic a target [19].
However, because physical adversarial artifacts are gener-
ally fabricated using a manufacturing method (e.g., 2D or
3D printing), adversarial attacks using such artifacts can-
not be carried out in real-time. In addition, the utility of
physical artifacts is limited in conducting at-scale physical
attacks targeting multiple users of a face recognition system
by the type of physical specimens that can be fabricated in
typical resource-constrained settings.
We investigate the feasibility of conducting a real-time
physical attack on face recognition systems using adver-
sarial light projections that can be used for imperson-
ating different enrolled users (called impersonation), or
evading recognition (called obfuscation). The adversary
first calibrates the camera-projector setup and then uses
a transformation-invariant adversarial pattern generation
method to generate adversarial patterns in the digital do-
main. These digital patterns are subsequently projected
onto the adversary’s face to conduct impersonation or ob-
fuscation attack. We refer to this attack as adversarial light
projection attack. As an example, impersonation is the goal
when an adversary intends to obtain access to a resource,
e.g., personal device protected with a target’s face. Obfus-
cation, on the other hand, is the goal of an adversary black-
listed by law enforcement agencies who wants to evade
recognition in scenarios such as border crossing.
A similar idea was recently proposed for fooling deep
learning classifiers designed for image classification sys-
tems [17]. However, the authors did not evaluate the utility
of their method in the context of face recognition systems.
Another recent work [28] fabricated a wearable cap with in-
frared LEDs to attack face recognition systems. Although
this work is similar in terms of its objective, our method
does not require a wearable artifact and thus offers an easier
alternative using off-the-shelf camera-projector setup (e.g.,
a portable mini projector [1]) for conducting physical at-
tacks on facial recognition systems. Preliminary experi-
ments conducted on 50 subjects show the vulnerability of
state-of-the-art face recognition systems to adversarial light
projection attacks in both white-box and black-box attack
settings.
1.1. Contributions
The major contributions of this work include:
• Investigation of real-time adversarial light projection
attacks using off-the-shelf camera-projector setup on
state-of-the-art face recognition systems.
• An efficient transformation-invariant adversarial pat-
tern generation method suitable for conducting real-
time adversarial light projection attacks.
• Demonstration of vulnerability of state-of-the-art face
recognition systems to adversarial light projection at-
tacks in both white-box and black-box settings.
2. Related Work
Existing research on adversarial attacks can be broadly
classified into two major categories: digital and physical
attacks. Given one or more examples from source and tar-
get class, digital attack methods generate adversarial pat-
tern(s) in the digital domain such that the pattern(s) results
in a source class example being misclassified as a target
class example (called targeted attack), or the source class
example being incorrectly classified as an example from a
different class (called untargeted attack). Physical attacks
extend this notion into the physical domain by using spe-
cially crafted adversarial artifacts for targeted or untargeted
attacks. Below we summarize the major research in the
two categories and contrast existing physical attack meth-
ods from the method presented here.
2.1. Digital Attacks
One of the first digital attack methods proposed by
Szegedy et al. in 2013 called L-BFGS [22] formulates the
goal of adversarial pattern generation as an optimization
problem, and uses a box-constrained optimizer and linear
search to find the optimal solution. In 2014, Goodfellow
et al. [8] proposed Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), a
single-step adversarial pattern generation method that uses
gradients computed from neural network parameters for ad-
versarial pattern generation. Following this, multiple exten-
sions of FGSM were introduced [10, 5, 24, 25].
Shi et al. [20] combine gradient ascent and descent with
binary search to find the adversarial pattern with the least `2
norm. One of the most popular adversarial pattern genera-
tion methods Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [13] uses
gradient projection space as a bound to generate `inf ad-
versarial patterns. Other prominent methods include Deep-
Fool [16] which was proposed for conducting untargeted at-
tacks with `p norm, and models adversarial pattern genera-
tion as a linear approximation problem, and SparseFool [15]
that aims to generate adversarial patterns by modifying a
minimal number of pixels. Another popular method pro-
posed by Carlini and Wagner [3] uses gradient descent with
a custom loss function to minimize the `p norm during ad-
versarial pattern generation.
2.2. Physical Attacks
Kurakin et al. [10] printed 2D adversarial patches con-
taining objects overlaid by adversarial patterns to attack
deep networks trained for the object recognition task. Sev-
eral other researchers directly printed 2D adversarial pat-
terns which are then manually attached to physical ob-
jects to attack object detection and classification algorithms
[4, 21, 7, 27]. Similarly, Thys et al. [23] printed 2D ad-
versarial patches to circumvent pedestrian detection classi-
fiers. Athalye et al. [2] proposed a transformation-invariant
adversarial pattern generation scheme called Expectation
of Transformations (EOT) to fabricate 3D adversarial ob-
jects designed to fool object classifiers. More recently, Li
et al. [11] printed adversarial dots on a 2D transparent pa-
per to provide adversarial input via the camera to an object
recognition system. Although the aforementioned methods
succeed in achieving their stated objective, they usually re-
quire extensive calibration of each 2D or 3D-printed artifact
before fabrication. In addition, they also require fabrica-
tion of physical artifacts. On the other hand, the camera-
projector setup used in the method presented here can be
calibrated once based on the attack environment, and then
subsequently used for conducting multiple real-time attacks
targeting different enrolled users of a face recognition sys-
tem.
Similar to this work, Nichols and Jasper [17] used a
camera-projector setup to generate 2D adversarial dot pat-
terns that are then projected onto the physical scene to at-
tack object recognition systems. However, they did not use
the setup for conducting impersonation or obfuscation at-
tacks on face recognition systems. Zhou et al. [28], on the
other hand, fabricated a wearable cap with infrared LEDs to
fool face recognition systems. Although this work is identi-
cal to the method presented here in terms of its objective,
our method does not require creation of a wearable arti-
fact and thus offers an easier alternative using off-the-shelf
camera-projector setup for conducting physical attacks on
facial recognition systems.
Projector
Camera
Project 
Capture
Projection wall
Figure 3: Different viewpoints in the camera-projector
setup. The physical adversary is assumed to be in the view
of both the camera and the projector.
3. Adversarial Light Projection Attack
The proposed adversarial light projection attack is per-
formed in two steps: the first step is to calibrate the camera-
projector setup based on the attack environment and com-
pute the adversarial pattern in the digital domain that can
be used to either evade recognition or impersonate a target,
and the second step is to project the computed digital adver-
sarial pattern onto the adversary’s face using the projector
to attack the deployed face recognition system (see Figure
2).
3.1. Assumptions
In the first step, the adversary is assumed to have either
white-box access1 or black-box access2 to the deployed face
recognition algorithm that the adversary intends to attack.
White-box is a reasonable assumption for face recognition
algorithms such as FaceNet [18] and SphereFace [12] that
are available in open-source. On the other hand, commer-
cial face recognition systems often only provide black-box
access. So we assume that the adversary uses an open-
source algorithm to generate adversarial patterns to attack
the black-box system. This assumption exploits the prop-
erty that adversarial patterns are highly transferable across
deep network architectures.
Additionally, we assume that the adversary has access
to an image of the target (in case of impersonation attack).
Further, the adversary has access to a camera to capture the
adversary’s own face image in order to compute the adver-
sarial light pattern, and a projector that is able to project
light patterns on his/her own face in the physical domain in
order to conduct the attack. In addition, the adversary has
prior knowledge of the environment where the face recog-
nition system is deployed. This is to ensure that the ad-
versarial light pattern can be calibrated based on the attack
environment before projection.
1In white-box setting, the adversary knows the internal details of the
model including the architecture and trained weight parameters.
2In black-box setting, the adversary only knows the decision/output of
the model for one or more inputs.
3.2. Practical Considerations
Adversarial light projection attacks are inherently chal-
lenging because of their unconstrained nature. Below we
discuss key practical considerations critical to the success
of such attacks:
• Environmental factors, for example ambient and posi-
tional lighting, and their interplay with the projected
light. Calibration of the attack setup based on the at-
tack environment is therefore integral to the success of
the attack (see Section 4).
• Intra-adversary facial variations especially due to
slight physical movements of the adversary, e.g., head
movements and changes in the distance to the camera,
while conducting the attack. Generation of adversar-
ial patterns that are relatively invariant to such varia-
tions is therefore critical to the success of the attack
(see Section 5).
• Intra-target facial variations because the adversary
would typically not have access to the enrolled im-
ages of the target in the deployed face recognition sys-
tem. Instead, the adversary would have target images
captured in a different context, such as social media.
Hence it is important that the generated adversarial
pattern be robust to the target’s facial variations (see
Section 5).
4. Attack Setup Calibration
The key assumption in this step is that the adversary ei-
ther has access to the actual attack environment or is able
to simulate the attack environment to a reasonable extent
in offline setting for calibration purposes. There are two
key calibration steps integral to success of the attack: (i)
position calibration: to ensure that the adversarial pattern
generated in the digital domain can be projected onto the
appropriate region of the adversary’s face while conducting
the attack, and (ii) color calibration: to ensure that the dig-
ital adversarial pattern is reproduced with high fidelity by
the projector as adversarial light.
4.1. Position calibration
Assume that the adversary is in view of both the camera
and the projector (Figure 3). There are two possible ways
to perform position calibration: (i) manual: the adversary
manually annotates a small number (3-4) of corresponding
points between the two views; or (ii) automatic: a facial
landmark detection algorithm is used to detect correspond-
ing facial landmarks from the two views. Once the land-
mark correspondences are determined, a calibration matrix
is computed to perform position calibration (see Figure 4).
Camera view point Aligned projector content
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Figure 4: Two possible methods for position calibration: (i)
manual (top row) and (ii) automatic (bottom row). Step 1:
Adversary’s face is captured using the camera, and facial
landmarks are either manually annotated or automatically
detected; Step 2: Projected scene (including the adversarys
face) is captured using the camera, and facial landmarks are
manually annotated or automatically detected; Step 3: Cor-
responding landmarks from step 1 and step 2 are used to
compute the calibration matrix to calibrate the adversarial
pattern before projection on the adversary’s face.
4.2. Color calibration
Let C and G be the color reproduction functions of the
camera and projector, respectively, in the physical attack
setting. The objective of color calibration is to find the color
transformation function Υ given C and G. Let x = C(x0),
where x0 is the physical adversary, x is the image of the
adversary in the digital domain, and h is the method used to
generate adversarial pattern in the digital domain. Also, as-
sume additive characteristic of the color reproduction func-
tions, i.e. C(color1 + color2) = C(color1) + C(color2).
The relationship between digital and physical domain can
then be expressed as follows:
C(x0 + G(Υ(h(x)))) = x+ h(x)
⇔ C(x0) + C(G(Υ(h(x))))) = x+ h(x)
⇔ C(G(Υ(h(x))))) = h(x)
⇔ Υ = (C ◦ G)−1
(1)
Given this relationship, the color calibration function Υ
is estimated using regression on the corresponding digital-
physical color pairs in the attack setting. In practice, we
found that performing regression in Lab color space results
in more accurate color reproduction in the physical domain
than standard RGB color space.
A reasonable estimate of Υ can be obtained using the
aforementioned method. However, the underlying assump-
tion here is that the adversary has prior access to the attack
environment. If this is not the case, the adversary can per-
form calibration on-the-fly before conducting the attack.
Algorithm 1 Transformation-Invariant Adversarial Pattern Generation
Input: Image of adversary x, target image y
Output: Adversarial pattern xadv
Notations: A: method to compute representative average image (equation 3); f : method to compute face embedding;
M: distance metric (e.g., `p, cosine); clip: method to clip intensity values (0-255); F : fusion function (e.g. summation);
α, β: hyper-parameters
1: procedure OPTIMIZE(x, y)
2: xtemp0 ← 0w×h, xavg0 ← x, and x0 ← x . Initialization
3: while not converge do
4: xavgt−1 ← A(xavgt−1) . Compute representative average image
5: xavgt ← clip(xavgt−1 + xtempt−1 + ζN (0,σ2)) . Clipped representative image
6: xt ← clip(xt−1 + xtempt−1 ) . Clipped image of adversary
7: Davg ←M(f(xavgt ), y) and D ←M(f(xt), y) . Distance computation using metricM
8: ∆η ← ∇xF (Davg,D)|x=xtempt−1 . Compute update with respect to both x and x
avg
9: gt ← β × gt−1 + ∆η‖∆η‖1 and x
temp
t ← xtempt−1 + α× sign(gt) . Gradient update with momentum
10: xadv = xt − x . Adversarial pattern
5. Transformation-Invariant Adversarial Pat-
tern Generation
Generation of adversarial patterns that are relatively in-
variant to intra-adversary facial variations is critical to the
success of light projection attacks. Let x and y, respectively,
be the images pertaining to the adversary and the target in
the digital domain that are used in the adversarial pattern
generation process. Existing methods (e.g., [2], [6]) gen-
erate a transformation-invariant adversarial pattern xadv by
applying different transformations on the adversary’s im-
age. In case of impersonation attack, the following opti-
mization is solved:
xadv = argmin
∆x
k−1∑
i=0
(wiL(Ti(x) + ∆x, y)), s.t.‖∆x‖p ≤ ε
(2)
Here, Ti corresponds to the ith transformation, wi corre-
sponds to the weight of Ti such that
∑k−1
i=0 wi = 1. Also,
L is the loss function of the face recognition algorithm used
in the adversarial pattern generation process. Equation 2 in-
volves computation of loss functions with respect to each
transformation in each iteration. This is computationally
intensive, and limits the application of these methods in
the setting where an adversary wants to generate adversarial
patterns in real-time.
5.1. Computing representative adversary image
Instead, our method computes an average representative
image xavg of the adversary as follows:
xavg = w0x+
k−1∑
i=1
(wiTi(x)) (3)
For the impersonation task, the following optimization is
then solved:
xadv = argmin
∆x
L(xavg + ∆x, y), s.t.‖∆x‖p ≤ ε (4)
Equation 4 does not require explicit computation of loss
functions for all possible transformations, yet explores a
wide variety of transformation configurations in each iter-
ation. The limitation though is that the optimization is per-
formed with respect to a single representative image, and
not with respect to expected loss pertaining to each transfor-
mation configuration. For real-time light projection attacks,
this trade-off is desirable.
Also note that although equations 2 and 4 pertain to im-
personation, equations for obfuscation can be formulated
and solved in a similar manner.
5.2. Using the original adversary image
Optimizing with respect to the representative image
xavg provides an efficient way to achieve transformation-
invariance. However, to ensure that the generated pattern re-
tains adversarial characteristics not only for the representa-
tive image xavg but for x as well, optimization with respect
to both xavg and x is performed. Figure 5 illustrates exam-
ple benefit for translation and rotation-invariance. Similar
benefits were observed for other transformations.
5.3. Proposed method
Algorithm 1 summarizes the proposed transformation-
invariant pattern generation method. The method takes as
input the image x of the adversary and the image of the tar-
get y, and outputs the adversarial pattern xadv . The trans-
formations used depend on the invariance objective (e.g.,
x
y
x
y
(a) Translation
(b) Rotation
Figure 5: Similarity scores shown in the left and right charts, respectively, without and with (a) translation-invariance (in x and
y direction in pixels) and (b) rotation-invariance (in degrees) for a particular adversary-image pair generated by FaceNet [18].
affine, perspective, photo-metric or others). The conver-
gence criteria is either number of steps or similarity score
threshold. A brightness term sampled from a normal dis-
tribution is used during each iterative update for obtaining
invariance to slight illumination changes (step 5). Further-
more, a binary mask can be used to constrain the facial re-
gion for which the adversarial pattern is generated similar
to [19].
5.4. Using multiple images of target
While the method described above focuses on intra-
adversary invariance, it is desirable to impart invariance to
intra-target variations as well to increase likelihood of suc-
cess. For this, multiple images of the target can be used.
Instead of a single target image, algorithm 1 can then be op-
timized with respect to target embedding y computed using
multiple target images.
6. Experimental Evaluation
To study the feasibility of adversarial light projection at-
tacks, live subject experiments are performed with 50 sub-
jects in total. Each experiment is conducted in a room with
fixed lighting. A Logitech web camera and a Panasonic or
Epson projector are used for the experiments.
6.1. Experimental setup
A web-based user interface is designed that takes real-
time input of a subject’s face using a web camera, and lets
the subject select/upload face images of the target. The in-
terface also lets the subject perform calibration based on the
camera feed and the connected projector. Multi-task con-
volutional neural network (MTCNN)-based face detection
and landmark estimation [26] is used for automatic position
calibration. For color calibration, the method described in
(a) (b)
Figure 6: Example of impersonation attack on the commercial face recognition system in black-box setting. Adversarial light
projected on adversary’s face in (a) results in the adversary being recognized as target (b). This example is interesting because
it appears that adversarial light resulted in failure of face detection (blue rectangle) yet the impersonation attack succeeded.
section 4.2 is used. If necessary, the brightness and color in-
tensity of the projector is manually tuned via the interface.
Post calibration, a python script executes the
transformation-invariant pattern generation method
(implemented in Tensorflow 2.0) for 100 iterations. Cosine
is used as distance metric and multiplication as the fusion
function. For gradient update, the parameters α and β are
set to 1 and 0.7 respectively. The following transformation
configurations (assuming the origin is centered at midpoint
of adversary’s image) are considered during generation of
the transformation-invariant pattern: −40 to +40 pixels
translation in both x and y directions, −pi/3 to +pi/3
rotation, and 0.5 − 2 times scaling. Each transformation
configuration is assumed to be equally likely.
The computed digital pattern is projected using the pro-
jector in the form of adversarial light onto the subject’s face.
The subject’s face with light projection is captured for about
30 seconds and used to attack a face recognition algorithm
in real-time. The subject is instructed to make natural head
movements (e.g. translation, rotation) during the duration
of the attack. Similarity score between each captured im-
age and the target face image is computed. If the com-
puted score for any adversary-target image pair is above
the threshold corresponding to False Accept Rate (FAR) of
0.01%, the attack attempt is considered successful. FaceNet
[18] and SphereFace [12] are the two face recognition al-
gorithms used in white-box setting. In black-box setting,
FaceNet is used to generate adversarial pattern to attack a
commercial face recognition algorithm.
6.2. Impersonation
For impersonation, a face image of a subject (adversary)
captured using the camera, and a face image of the target
(obtained from the web or a database) are used to gener-
ate the digital adversarial pattern. A different face image
of the target (also obtained from the web or a database) is
assumed to be enrolled in the face recognition system to be
Experiment #Subjects #Attempts #Success
imp-fix-FN 25 25 23
imp-fix-SF 25 25 21
imp-fix-CO 25 25 15
imp-select-FN 15 15 14
imp-select-SF 15 15 12
imp-top5-FN 10 50 44
imp-top5-SF 10 50 39
obf-FN 10 10 10
obf-SF 10 10 10
obf-CO 10 10 7
Table 1: Impersonation (imp) and obfuscation (obf) exper-
iments conducted on live subjects. FC, SF and CO refer to
FaceNet, SphereFace and the commercial face recognition
system respectively. Similarity score threshold correspond-
ing to FAR=0.01% is used to determine if the attack was
successful.
attacked. Impersonation attempts are made using different
subject pools in the following scenarios.
• Fixed target: Impersonating a fixed high-profile tar-
get (Rowan Atkinson). 25 subjects in total attempted
this in both white-box and black-box setting. 23 and
21 attempts out of 25 on FaceNet and SphereFace, re-
spectively, succeeded. In black-box setting, 15 out of
25 attempts on the commercial system succeeded.
• Selected target: Impersonating any one of the given
targets (Taylor Swift, Michael Phelps, or Albert Ein-
stein) at random. A total of 15 subjects attempted this
in white-box setting. 14 and 12 attempts out of 15 on
FaceNet and SphereFace, respectively, succeeded.
• Top-k similar targets: Given a database of target im-
(a) (b)
Figure 7: Example of impersonation attack on SphereFace
[12] in white-box setting. Adversarial light projected on
adversary’s face in (a) results in the adversary being recog-
nized as target (b).
ages (Labelled Faces in the Wild (LFW) database [9]),
impersonate top-k most similar targets based on a face
recognition algorithm. 10 different subjects attempted
this on five most similar targets from LFW in white-
box setting. 44 and 39 out of 50 attempts on FaceNet
and SphereFace, respectively, succeeded.
Table 1 summarizes the experimental results. Figures 1, 7
and 6 show successful examples of impersonation, respec-
tively, on FaceNet, SphereFace and the commercial face
recognition system.
6.3. Obfuscation
For obfuscation, two face images of a subject (adversary-
target pair) captured using the camera are used to generate
digital adversarial pattern. A different face image of the
same subject (target) is assumed to be enrolled. 10 differ-
ent subjects attempted obfuscation attacks in both white-
box and black-box setting. All 10 obfuscation attempts
on FaceNet and SphereFace succeeded in white-box set-
ting, whereas in black-box setting 7 out of 10 attempts on
the commercial face recognition system succeeded. Table
1 summarizes the experimental results. Figure 8 shows a
successful example of obfuscation on the commercial face
recognition system.
6.4. Failure Cases
While most impersonation and obfuscation attempts are
successful, failure of adversarial light projection attacks is
observed due to one or more of the following reasons:
• Light projection either covering the entire face or sig-
nificantly occluding majority of the face resulting in
failure of face detection. Projection of adversarial light
on a particular part of the face, e.g., cheeks or fore-
head, is found to result in higher likelihood of success
in practice.
Figure 8: Example of obfuscation attack on the commercial
face recognition system in black-box setting. Adversarial
light projected on adversary’s face results in successful ob-
fuscation.
• Strong ambient or directional lighting that overpowers
the projected light.
• Extreme facial pose of the adversary. In practice, how-
ever, this is less likely as the adversary is cooperative.
• Out of focus light projection on the adversary’s face
when the projector lens is not tuned appropriately.
Manual tuning of the projector lens to ensure the pro-
jected light is properly focused on the adversary’s face
is important for a successful attack attempt in practice.
We plan to investigate failure cases in a more systematic
manner in a follow-up study.
7. Conclusions and Future Work
We show the feasibility of conducting impersonation and
obfuscation attacks using adversarial light projections on
two open-source face recognition systems in white-box set-
ting and a commercial face recognition system in black-box
setting. Furthermore, an efficient transformation-invariant
adversarial pattern generation method that enables an ad-
versary to conduct light projection attacks in real-time is
presented.
While we have shown the feasibility of light projection
attacks, we have not systematically tested the likelihood of
success in different environments. One of our immediate
goals, therefore, is to systematically investigate the impact
of environmental and subject-dependent covariates (such as
lighting and subject pose) on the repeatability of light pro-
jection attacks. Furthermore, we suspect that presentation
attack detection methods designed for static attacks using
2D or 3D fabricated artifacts will be inadequate in defend-
ing against dynamic adversarial attacks such as light pro-
jection attacks. Therefore, we also plan to conduct an eval-
uation of existing defense mechanisms and develop novel
defense mechanisms for such dynamic attacks.
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